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THE FRAGILITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S
UNIVERSAL COVERAGE STRATEGY
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS Article examines the very fragile nature of the Patient Protectionand Affordable Care Act's ("ACA")' approach to near-universal health
insurance coverage, as accentuated by a variety of implementation hurdles and
challenges. The ACA's vision for expanding insurance coverage was to build on
the country's existing patchwork of market-based health insurance delivery for
most, combined with government insurance for select segments of the
population. But that patchwork strategy is only as strong as the threads that tie it
together. Over the past five years since the ACA was enacted, the threads have
unraveled in several critical spots.
The United States has deliberately and repeatedly declined to establish a
comprehensive national health-care system. The ACA, while dramatic in scope
and aim, demonstrates our unwillingness to embrace that sort of centralized,
single-payer approach. When the bills that would become the ACA were being
debated in Congress, any such single-payer proposal would have been a political
non-starter. 2 As this author has explained elsewhere, such a move would require
tectonic shifts in public attitudes toward subsidization and rationing. 3  Even
relatively modest suggestions to allow a government health plan to be offered in
the same market with commercial health plans-the "public option"-were
quickly nixed by lawmakers.4
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Special thanks to the University
of Toledo Law Review for outstanding editorial work on this Article and generous hospitality
during the live symposium.
1. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(2014).
2. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 443
(2009) (discussing the possibility of single-payer or public-option approaches); Dan Eggen,
'Single-Payer' Supporters Challenge Democrats, WASH. POST, June 6, 2009, at A3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060503518.html; Jane
Mansbridge, A Healthcare History Lesson for the GOP, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/15/opinion/la-oe-mansbridge-obamacare-democrats-single-
payer-20131015.
3. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13
NEV. L.J. 872 (2013).
4. Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Reject Pair of Public Option Proposals, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/health/policy/30health.html?_r-0.
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Accordingly, we remain committed to a non-system of health insurance
delivery. The ACA is a monumental achievement in reforming a number of
major distortions of the existing health insurance market and closing gaps in the
existing public insurance programs. Nevertheless, what this Article hopes to
elucidate is just how delicate the ACA's balancing act is; it does so by drawing
together a number of discrete events in the post-enactment period. Perhaps after
realizing how tenuously the whole arrangement is held together, we may be
willing, in the future, to entertain more comprehensive reform and establishment
of a true health care system.
II. BACKGROUND
With that introduction, consider the foundation of existing insurance
coverage on which the ACA attempts to build: In 2009, before the ACA was
enacted, close to half of the U.S. population was covered by an employer-
sponsored health plan. Public health insurance programs, predominately
Medicare and Medicaid, covered nearly one-third of the population. A very
small portion, just 5%, purchased individual or small group coverage through the
private market. The remaining 18% of the population were uninsured.5
Without disrupting anyone's existing coverage (recall President Obama's
famous "you can keep your health plan" promise6), the ACA sought to build on
the existing pieces of the pie to cover the uninsured wedge. First, public health
insurance coverage was expanded through changes to Medicaid eligibility.
Second, the ACA sought to reform the individual and small group health
insurance market by creating new regulated "exchange" marketplaces and
restricting a wide range of traditional commercial insurance underwriting and
ratemaking practices. Third, employer-sponsored coverage was bolstered, if not
significantly expanded, through a combination of subsidies, mandates, and
penalties. Each of those three components of the ACA's coverage strategy has
suffered considerable erosions since the Act was passed.
If successful, the ACA promised to reduce the number of uninsured
Americans from 57 million to 23 million. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services's ("CMS") chief actuary estimated that roughly half (18
million) of the 34 million newly insured would gain coverage through Medicaid
expansion. Another 16 million were expected to receive coverage under the
newly created health insurance exchanges. Employer-sponsored health insurance
5. RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED AT THE
STARTING LINE: FINDINGS FROM THE 2013 KAISER SURVEY OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS AND THE
ACA, at i (2014), available at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/8552-
the-uninsured-at-the-starting-line7.pdf (regarding 18% uninsured rate); id. at 5 (regarding 5% non-
group insurance purchasers).
6. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of
Grandfathering under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 754 n.2 (internal citations
omitted).
7. Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs. 1, 6 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf.
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was expected to remain the largest source of coverage in the United States, with
an estimated 13 million employees and families becoming insured through that
means. At the same time, 14 million people currently receiving employer-
sponsored coverage would be shifted to Medicaid or plans offered through the
exchan es, resulting in a net decrease of 1 million people in the employer slice of
the pie.
III. THE ACA's UNIVERSAL COVERAGE STRATEGY
This Part describes the various ingredients of the ACA's universal coverage
strategy and the major erosions that each has experienced. As will be revealed,
the components of the strategy are interdependent; erosion of one may cascade
onto another. The discussion begins with expansion of the government slice of
the pie, primarily through Medicaid. Next, various reforms intended to expand
coverage through the individual and small group market are described. The Part
concludes with the ACA's strategies to maintain, if not expand, the current level
of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.
A. Government Slice
The ACA, as enacted, significantly re-envisioned the role of Medicaid in
providing coverage for low-income individuals and families. A surprising U.S.
Supreme Court decision, however, diluted that vision, allowing states to opt out
of the ACA's expansion of Medicaid. 9 By design, the ACA gradually eliminates
another government health-care program, the Children's Health Insurance
Program ("CHIP"), on the expectation that the low- and middle-income CHIP
beneficiaries would obtain coverage on the exchanges. Due to a drafting glitch,
however, that expectation may not be realized. The combined effect of these
developments undermines the ACA's expansion of coverage through government
programs.
1. Medicaid Expansion
The ACA included unambiguous and significant expansion of public health
insurance coverage through Medicaid. By statute, the ACA does away with
categorical eligibility for Medicaid, which was historically limited to the
"deserving" poor, namely, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant women, children,
caretakers of eligible children, and the medically indigent.' 0 Instead, the ACA
implemented an across-the-board income test for Medicaid eligibility: Congress
8. Id. at 6-8.
9. Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB v.
Sebelius].
10. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution
from Medicaid to SCHIP, I J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 7-8 (2004); Sandra Tanenbaum,
Medicaid Eligibility Policy in the 1980s: Medical Utilitarianism and the "Deserving" Poor, 20 J.
HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 933, 933-34 (1995).
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deemed anyone with income below 133% of the federal poverty level'I as
"deserving" of public health insurance. As Professor Huberfeld's article in this
symposium explains,1 2 Medicaid expansion operates as a significant step toward
a single-payor health-care system. The Medicaid element of the ACA's near-
universal coverage strategy was expected to account for approximately 18
million of the newly insured.'
Medicaid has always operated as a federal-state partnership, with the
federal government offering states matching funds for voluntarily implementing
state programs compliant with federal requirements.' 4  Due to the anti-
commandeering limit on federal spending power, Congress cannot simply require
states to implement federal programs or policies. 5  All 50 states, however,
voluntarily have participated in the Medicaid program since at least the 1980s.1 6
Pre-ACA, the federal match ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on the state's
relative poverty level.' 7 The ACA offered much more generous federal funding
for states agreeing to expand coverage, beginning with three years of full (100%)
federal funding, trending down to perpetual 90% federal funding.18
Despite the universal acceptance of Medicaid conditional funding by the 50
states and previously unquestioned constitutionality of the program, 26 states
(including my own, Georgia) challenged Congress's exercise of its spending
power to incentivize state participation in federal program implementation.1 9 The
Medicaid expansion challenge was a tagalong to the higher-profile lawsuit over
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2014) (expanding Medicaid eligibility). See also 42
C.F.R. § 435.603(d)(1) (2014) (specifying 5% income disregard, which technically brings
eligibility level to 138% FPL).
12. Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as Social
Insurance, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 545 (2015).
13. See Foster, supra note 7, at 6.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (2014) (listing the percentage of state spending that the federal
government will match, depending on the type of expenditure); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308
(1980) (describing the "cooperative federalism" approach enacted in order "to provide federal
financial assistance for all legitimate state expenditures under an approved Medicaid plan");
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal
Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 134-35 (2011) [hereinafter Leonard, Rhetorical
Federalism].
15. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 211 (1987).
16. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 445 n.69 (2011)
("Arizona and Alaska were holdouts, with Arizona joining Medicaid in 1982 and Alaska joining in
1972.").
17. Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage ("FMAP") calculations are published in the
Federal Register each year. See, e.g., ALISON MITCHELL & EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, MEDICAID'S
FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP), FY2014, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2013), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R4294 1.pdf.
18. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (2013),
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume92n4/documents/
OUTTERSON.pdf.
19. Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240
n.2, 1262-64 (11th Cir. 2011), aj'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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the constitutionality of the ACA's individual mandate. 2 0  Although both
arguments seemed dubious when first asserted, several lower courts accepted the
suggestion that the individual mandate might exceed congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. 2 1 No lower court, however, had struck down
Medicaid expansion as exceeding congressional spending power. Both the
Florida District Court and Eleventh Circuit, while holding the individual mandate
unconstitutional, upheld Medicaid expansion as within congressional power.22
But the Supreme Court, to great surprise, in NFIB v. Sebelius, for the first
time struck down a congressional enactment as exceeding the spending power.2 3
The Court reasoned that the ACA's Medicaid expansion was coercive of states,
giving them no real option but to expand, on pain of losing not only "new"
federal funding for the expansion population but also all existing (pre-ACA)
federal funding for Medicaid.24 The "remedy" that the Court (or more precisely,
Justice Ginsburg) devised for this unconstitutionality was that states had to be
given the option to continue participating in "old" Medicaid, with no loss of
fundin , or to extend eligibility to new beneficiaries, as specified under the
ACA. In effect, the Court deemed the statutory mandate to expand coverage as
merely an option.26
At last count, 28 states and the District of Columbia had accepted the
Court's invitation and agreed to expand Medicaid coverage to all individuals
below 133% of federal poverty level.27 Before the ACA, states could receive
federal dollars to cover additional beneficiaries besides those required under
federal Medicaid law. Most states declined to do so, or offered coverage of non-
mandatory beneficiaries up to a much lower income level.28 The impact of
states' elections not to expand coverage after the ACA will leave nearly four
million of the expected newly insured individuals uninsured. 2 9  As just one
20. See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
21. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Affordable Care Act Litigation: The Standing Paradox, 38 AM.
J.L. & MED. 410, 427 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac-artchop/900.
22. Huberfeld et al., supra note 18, at 31-32.
23. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("THE
CHIEF JUSTICE therefore-for the first time ever-finds an exercise of Congress' spending
power unconstitutionally coercive.").
24. Huberfeld et al., supra note 18, at 36-39.
25. Id. at 39-40.
26. Id.
27. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-
under-the-affordable-care-act/ (last updated July 20, 2015); Where the States Stand on Medicaid
Expansion, ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY, http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/
primers/medicaidmap (last updated July 22, 2015).
28. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, EXPANDING
MEDICAID TO LOW-INCOME CHILDLESS ADULTS UNDER HEALTH REFORM: KEY LESSONS FROM STATE
EXPERIENCES 2 (2010), available at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/
8087.pdf.
29. RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COVERAGE GAP:
UNINSURED POOR ADULTS IN STATES THAT Do NOT EXPAND MEDICAID-AN UPDATE 2 (2014),
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example, the Medicaid "doughnut hole," in Georgia will result in close to half a
million individuals without insurance. 30  Residents of Georgia, Texas, and
Florida combined represent nearly half of the uninsured in the coverage gap.
Georgia presently covered parents of eligible dependent children up to 39% of
federal poverty level 32 (roughly $8,000 annual income for a family of three33).
Non-disabled adults without dependent children are simply ineligible for
Medicaid.
Although states certainly retain discretion to establish their own programs
to cover these excluded populations, that seems an unlikely outcome. Most states
declining to expand Medicaid under the ACA cited the increased costs, even with
the promise of very generous federal funding. Accordingly, we would not expect
states to dramatically expand social welfare programs entirely on their own
dollars.
2. CHIP's "Family Glitch"
The ACA also has implications for the Children's Health Insurance
Program, another cooperative federal-state health insurance program. This
program remains vulnerable to de-authorization and has spin-off effects on other
elements of the universal coverage strategy. CHIP covers children in families
that earn too much to qualify for Medicaid. 34 States' upper income limits range
from 200% to 300% of federal poverty level. In some states, CHIP also covers
available at http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-
states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid-an-update.
30. Interactive: A State-by-State Look at How the Uninsured Fare Under the ACA, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/interactive/uninsured-gap/ (last updated July 17, 2015);
Closing the Coverage Gap, GEORGIANS FOR A HEALTHY FUTURE,
http://healthyfuturega.org/issues/cover-georgia (last visited Sept. 14, 2015); Phil Galewitz, Report:
5.2 Million Adults Will Fall Into ACA Coverage Gap Next Year, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/report-5-2-million-adults-will-fall-into-aca-
coverage-gap-next-year.
31. Galewitz, supra note 30.
32. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FOR ADULTS AS OF JANUARY 1,
2014, at I fig.1 (2013), available at http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-eligibility-for-
adults-as-of-january-1 -2014/.
33. COVERAGEFORALL.ORG, 2014 FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL 1 (2014), available at
https://coverageforall.org/pdf/FHCE.FedPovertyLevel.pdf; 2015 Poverty Guidelines,
MEDICAD.GOV 1 (2015), http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/
eligibility/downloads/2015-federal-poverty-level-charts.pdf.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b), (u)(1) (2014) (allowing for the optional use of state child health
assistance funds as part of an enhanced Medicaid match for low-income children). See generally
42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-jj (2014) (adding Title XXI to the SSA, thereby establishing the State
Children's Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP")).
35. Eligibility, MEDICAID.Gov, http://www.medicaid.gov/chip/eligibility-standards/chip-
eligibility-standards.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015); Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibility
Limits for Children as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/medicaid-and-chip-income-eligibility-limits-for-
children-at-application-as-of-april-1-2014/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2015).
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parents and pregnant women. Like Medicaid, CHIP is voluntary, and, like
Medicaid, all states participate. 7 CHIP has a shorter history and has been more
politically vulnerable over time, with repeated struggles for reauthorization and
differences of political opinion about extending government health insurance to
middle-income children and families.3 8
The culmination of that tension is that the ACA, rather than expanding or
maintaining CHIP, funds the program only through September 2015. 3 The
assumption is that middle-income families previously eligible for CHIP instead
would be eligible for subsidized coverage on the exchanges. But that expectation
is undermined for working families by the ACA's "family glitch." 40 Federal tax
subsidies are available to help individuals and families purchase private
insurance on the new exchanges but only if they are offered "unaffordable"
coverage at work. By regulation, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") defined
"unaffordable" by reference to an individual, employer-sponsored health41
insurance plan that costs more than 9.5% of household income.
The IRS's unaffordability definition does not refer the cost of a family plan.
The family glitch, therefore, occurs when one (or both) parent's employer offers
affordable individual coverage, but family coverage either is not offered or is
unaffordable.42 The individual employee(s) might be covered, but the rest of the
36. The Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/medicaid-chip/childrens-health-insurance-program/ (last visited Aug.
31, 2015); Medicaid and CHIP Income Eligibility Limits for Pregnant Women as a Percent of the
Federal Poverty Level, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/state-
indicator/medicaid-and-chip-income-eligibility-limits-for-pregnant-women-at-application-as-of-
april-1-2014/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2015).
37. GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY ET AL., URBAN INST., MEDICAID/CHIP PARTICIPATION RATES
AMONG CHILDREN: AN UPDATE 2 (2013), available at http://www.urban.org/research/
publication/medicaidchip-participation-rates-among-children-update.
38. Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396u-7 (2014). See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Class Competition and American Health Care:
Debating the Children's Health Insurance Program, 70 LA. L. REV. 683 (2010); Sara Rosenbaum
et al., Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, I J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2004).
39. See generally ROBIN RUDOWITZ ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND, CHILDREN'S
HEALTH COVERAGE: MEDICAID, CHIP AND THE ACA (2014), available at
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/8570-childrens-health-coverage-
medicaid-chip-and-the-aca I.pdf (discussing reauthorization considerations).
40. Editorial, A Glitch in Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at SRIO, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/a-glitch-in-health-care-reform.html?_r-0;
Ryan White, 'Family Glitch' Can Leave Kids Without Affordable Health Coverage,
USCANNENBERG: REPORTING ON HEALTH (June 19, 2014), http://www.reportingonhealth.org/
2014/06/18/family-glitch-leaves-kids-without-affordable-health-coverage.
41. See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544,
8565 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, 301), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-12/pdf/2014-03082.pdf. Note that "unaffordability" is
defined as 8% of income for purposes of individuals' exemption from the minimum essential
coverage requirement, see infra note 53, but as 9.5% of income for purposes of triggering the
employers' free rider penalty.
42. Brittany La Couture & Conor Ryan, The Family Glitch, AM. ACTION FORUM (Sept. 18,
2014), http://americanactionforum.org/research/the-family-glitch#_ednref4.
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family would not be and also would be ineligible for subsidies on the exchanges
because the unaffordability trigger would not have been tripped. The IRS
responded to the problem by exemptin& families impacted by the glitch from
enforcement of the individual mandate. Nevertheless, those families remain
uninsured, including close to half a million children.4 Overall, if CHIP is
allowed to sunset, and those children are shifted to the exchanges, and the
unaffordability definition stays in place, 1.9 million children potentially could be
without coverage.45 To remove the glitch, the administration would need to
redefine "unaffordability" by reference to a family plan. That interpretation is
seemingly in keeping with congressional intent although not supported by the
plain language of the statute.4 6 That tension between congressional intent and
statutory text would likely invite a new round of litigation challenging ACA
implementation.4 7
The interplay of CHIP reauthorization and availability of federal assistance
to purchase private insurance again reveals the precarious nature of the ACA's
universal coverage strategy. Just as the successful judicial challenge to Medicaid
expansion had a dramatic negative impact on coverage expectations due to states'
decisions to opt out, the "family glitch" may similarly erode the statutory
scheme. As the next Part describes, expansions of coverage through the private
market to help individuals, families, and small groups purchase their own
coverage also faces affronts.
B. Private Market Slice
A number of the ACA's most publicized and most popular provisions aim
at expanding the very small slice of the pie that represents coverage in the small
group and individual market.48 By prohibiting insurers from refusing to cover
individuals with preexisting conditions and requiring them to set premiums
without regard to most health-status factors,49 the ACA aims to bring many
people who previously could not obtain or afford insurance into the market.
43. Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 8564,
8600.
44. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-648, CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR IMPROVED ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE INSURANCE 13-14 (June 2012),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/591797.pdf.
45. Joe Touschner, GAO to IRS: Consider the Family Penalty, GEORGETOWN U. HEALTH
PoL'Y INST. CENTER FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES: A CHILDREN'S HEALTH POL'Y BLOG (July 30,
2012), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/gao-irs-the-family-penalty/; CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE,
supra note 44, at 13-14.
46. White, supra note 40.
47. See, e.g., King v, Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (considering statutory interpretation
challenge to availability of premium assistance tax credits under the ACA).
48. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges to the
Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 804 (2012) [hereinafter Leonard,
Rhetoric Hits the Road].
49. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-300gg(4) (2014) (allowing limited rate discrimination based on tobacco
use, age, workplace wellness program participation, geography, and individual versus family
coverage).
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Those requirements, however, present a significant adverse selection problem
because individuals could wait until they become sick to purchase coverage,
thereby reducing the quantum of low-risk individuals paying premiums into the
pool to balance out the cost of providing care to high-risk individuals.so
Accordingly, the ACA requires most individuals 51 to obtain minimum essential
coverage or pay a tax penalty for failing to do so." For purposes of discussion
below, one of the most important exemptions from the mandate to obtain health
insurance is based on unaffordability; that is, if the lowest price coverage costs
more than 8% of one's income, then one is not required to have health
insurance.53
For middle- and lower-income individuals who are not eligible for
government health-care programs or are not offered employer-sponsored health
insurance, the ACA offers financial assistance to purchase private coverage.
Federal financial assistance takes two forms: First, individuals and families with
income between 100% and 400% of federal poverty level are eligible for sliding-
scale premium assistance tax subsidies.54  That assistance reaches distinctly
middle-income individuals, earning uw to $46,680 annually, and families, earning
up to $95,400 for a family of four. The amount of federal assistance varies
based on income and insurance premiums in the applicant's state. Individuals
and families who qualify for other assistance, including government health-care
programs, or who are offered affordable, minimum essential coverage from an
employer-based plan, are not eligible for premium assistance tax credits. 56
Second, individuals and families with slightly lower incomes, between
100% and 250% of the federal poverty level, may also qualify for cost-sharing
reduction payments. These payments help reduce out-of-pocket costs, such as
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance, for eligible individuals. As enacted,
individuals and families below 100% of the federal poverty level would be
eligible for public coverage through Medicaid expansion.58 Above 400% of the
federal poverty level, purchasers are subject to full market prices, but with
various other controls and adjustments to coverage, premiums, and cost-sharing.
50. 42 U.S.C § 18091(2)(1) (2014) (providing rationale).
51. 48 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (b), (d) (2014). See also 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)-(e) (2014) (listing
exemptions, including religious conscience, incarceration, foreign residence, and unaffordability).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 500OA(b)(1), (3) (2014). See also 26 U.S.C. § 500OA(c) (2014) (listing
penalty as $695/individual or 2.5% of income (above the tax filing threshold) at full
implementation, but only $95/individual in the first year).
53. Exemptions From the Fee for Not Having Health Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/fees-exemptions/exemptions-from-the-fee/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
54. 26 I.R.C. § 36B (2014).
55. Federal Poverty Level Guidelines, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/federal-
poverty-level/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
56. Questions and Answers on the Premium Tax Credit, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Individuals-and-Families/Questions-and-Answers-on-the-
Premium-Tax-Credit (last updated July 13, 2015).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2014). Section 18071(b)(1) specifies that the credit is available for
eligible individuals who enroll in qualified silver-level plans.
58. See supra Part Il.A.I.
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1. Individual Mandate Challenge
The first attack on the private market reforms was the previously mentioned
constitutional challenge to the individual mandate. 59 A federal requirement to
purchase a commercial product struck many as the government overreaching into
their private lives. Individual rights, such as liberty, privacy, and property,
however, are not threatened in any constitutionally protected way by the
individual mandate. 60 Therefore, the challenge was framed as a structural one,
asserting again that Congress had exceeded the scope of its enumerated powers,
as against states' reserved powers.61 Although the Supreme Court ultimately
upheld the individual mandate as a valid exercise of congressional taxing power,
the case resulted in a lengthy plurality opinion "holding" (but with enough votes
to make it count) that the mandate violates the commerce power.62
If the individual mandate challenge had been successful, it would have
undermined expansion of the sliver of pie representing individual and small
group coverage. Insurers would be left to cover anyone who applied, no matter
how sick, at the same premium rates as anyone else in the market. Under that
arrangement, insurers simply could not continue to offer affordable insurance and
remain solvent. 6 3  The employer piece of the pie would also have been
compromised inasmuch as employees, no longer facing potential sanctions for
failing to have insurance, might not pressure their employers to offer insurance to
the same degree that they would with the mandate inplace.
Fortunately, the legal challenge was averted, but implementation of the
requirement was not without hurdles. The technological shortcomings of the
Healthcare.gov website, through which online applications for government
health-care programs and government subsidies were to be channeled, were
legion.6 5 In addition, defying President Obama's promise, a number of insurers
59. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584 (2012) (summarizing arguments).
60. Leonard, Rhetoric Hits the Road, supra note 48, at 811 n.203.
61. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577-80.
62. See Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 & n.18 (2013).
63. See Matthew O'Brien, Everything You Need to Know About Obamacare and 'Death
Spirals', THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/1I/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-obamacare-and-death-spirals/281315/ (regarding the insurance
"death spiral"); Lawrence 0. Gostin & Elenora E. Connors, Health Care Reform in Transition:
Incremental Insurance Reform Without an Individual Mandate, 303 JAMA 1188, 1188-89 (2010),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1382&context-
facpub.
64. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2573 (construing individual mandate penalty as constitutional tax).
65. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-824T, HEALTHCARE.GOV: CONTRACT
PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT PRACTICES WERE INEFFECTIVE GIVEN THE CHALLENGES AND RISKS 1, 2
(July 31, 2014), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20140731/102587/HHRG-
113-IF02-Wstate-WoodsW-20140731.pdf (testimony of William T. Woods, Dir., Acquisitions &
Sourcing Mgmt. Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce).
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sent cancellation notices of pre-ACA plans to insureds, apparently
demonstrating that, in fact, you cannot keep your health plan. In response to
those fiascos, the administration effectively extended the deadline for compliance
with the individual mandate through 2016 by allowing most anyone to self-
certify plan cancellation and thereby obtain a hardship exemption from the
mandate penalty. 6 7  If conservative pundits are correct, the administration's
accommodation for plan cancellations could effectively gut the ACA's hard-
fought, signature reform and the overall universal coverage strategy. 68
2. Premium Assistance Tax Subsidies Challenge
An additional significant threat to the ACA's near-universal coverage is the
potential unavailability of federal subsidies for close to half of the otherwise
eligible population.6 9 In addition to Medicaid, the ACA includes several other
opportunities for states to engage in "cooperative federalism," assisting with
implementation of federal policy. 7 0  One of those options allows states to
establish their own exchanges or regulated marketplaces for individual and small
group insurance. 7 ' Like Medicaid, the ACA sets federal requirements with which
66. Julie Appleby & Anna Gorman, Thousands of Consumers Get Insurance Cancellation Due
To Health Law Changes, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/
news/cancellation-notices-health-insurance/; Louise Radnofsky & Anna Wilde Mathews, Health
Insurers Notify Consumers of Canceled Plans, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014, 7:40 PM ET),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurers-notify-consumers-of-canceled-plans- 1412293249;
Julie Appleby, Insurers Poised to Cancel Health Plans That Don't Comply with Affordable Care
Act, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/insurers-
poised-to-cancel-health-plans-that-dont-comply-with-affordable-care-act/2014/10/02/31525c74-
49b3-1 l e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html.
67. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Options Available for
Consumers with Cancelled Policies (Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/
CCIHO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/cancellation-consumer-options-12-19-
2013.pdf; Memorandum from Gary Cohen, Dir., Center for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight;
Insurance Standards Bulletin Series-Extension of Transitional Policy through October 1, 2016
(Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Downloads/transition-to-compliant-policies-03-06-2015.pdf; ObamaCare's Secret Mandate
Exemption, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:58 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SBl0001424052702304250204579433312607325596; Juliet Eilperin et al., Obama Announces
Change to Address Health Insurance Cancellations, WASH. PosT. (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamato-to-announce-change-to-address-health-insurance
-cancellations/2013/1 1/14/3be49d24-4d37-1 le3-9890-al eO997fbOcOstory.html.
68. Michael Tennant, White House Effectively Delays Individual Mandate Through 2016, THE
NEW AMERICAN (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/health-care/item/ 17842-
white-house-effectively-delays-individual-mandate-through-2016; Mark Cunningham, The Obama
Team Quietly Gives Up on Making ObamaCare Work, N.Y. POST (Mar. 12, 2014, 10:27 PM),
http://nypost.com/2014/03/12/the-obama-team-quietly-gives-up-on-making-obamacare-work/.
69. Halbig, King Decisions Overturning Subsidies May Hinder ACA Implementation,
WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUSINESS (Aug. 4, 2014), http://news.wolterskluwerlb.com/news/halbig-
king-decisions-overturning-subsidies-may-hinder-aca-implementation/.
70. Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism, supra note 14, at 132-61.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (b)(1) (2014) ("Each State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish
an American Health Benefit Exchange (referred to in this title as an 'Exchange') for the State .... ").
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participating states must comply. But rather than conditional funding, the ACA's
approach to exchange implementation operates on conditional preemption. In
other words, if states elect not to establish their own exchanges, the federal
government will do so for them.72 Some federal funding, in the form of
exchange establishment grants, is also available to states.
Under the ACA's statutory design, the exchanges are the gateway to access
federal financial assistance to purchase private health insurance on the
exchanges. IRS rulemaking specified that premium assistance tax credits would
be available in both states that operated their own exchanges and states in which
the federal fallback operated.74 Implemented nationwide, it was estimated that 17
million people would qualify for federal tax credits in 2014, out of the 29 million
potential nationwide market for exchanges. 7 5 The rule seemed a noncontroversial
application of the statutory design and language.
Nevertheless, the same people who brought the seemingly far-fetched
commerce clause challenge to the individual mandate also raised the novel
suggestion that federal premium assistance tax credits are available only in states
that establish their own exchanges, not in states where the federal government
does so for them. That suggested interpretation might have been less dramatic
if, as Congress likely expected, most states opted to establish their own
exchanges. As it turned out, a clear majority of states-more than opted out of
Medicaid expansion-opted not to establish their own exchanges, leaving the
task to the federal government. That means, if the argument succeeds, that
residents in states with federally facilitated exchanges will be ineligible for
federal financial assistance to purchase insurance, leaving another gaping hole in
the ACA's near-universal coverage strategy.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2014) (providing that if a state refuses or is unable to set up an
Exchange, the federal government, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS"),
"shall ... establish and operate such Exchange within the State").
73. Leonard, Rhetoric Hits the Road, supra note 48, at 798.
74. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377-01(1)(f) (May 23, 2012);
Definitions, 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2013).
75. State-by-State Estimates of the Number of People Eligible for Premium Tax Credits Under
the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2013), http://kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/state-by-state-estimates-of-the-number-of-people-eligible-for-premium-tax-
credits-under-the-affordable-care-act/.
76. Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal
IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 134-35 (2013),
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/cannon-adler-health-matrix-23.pdf
See also Glen Whitman, Hazards of the Individual Health Care Mandate, CATO INST. (Sept./Oct.
2007), http://www.cato.org/policy-report/septemberoctober-2007/hazards-individual-health-care-
mandate.
77. See generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCHANGES OR MARKETPLACES: STATE PROFILES AND ACTIONS (Mar. 2015), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/l/Documents/Health/Health InsuranceExchangesStateProfiles.pdf;
Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 12.
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The Supreme Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius was dubbed the "June
Surprise."78 Two summers later, the D.C. Circuit and Fourth Circuit brought us
the "July Surprise," in the form of same-day, conflicting opinions in Halbig v.
Burwelli9 and King v. Burwell.80 A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
accepted the challengers' argument and declared, based on textualist and
contextualist reading of the ACA, that federal premium assistance tax subsidies
are available only in states with state-operated exchanges.8 1 The Fourth Circuit
held the opposite, recognizing Congress's overarching design to expand coverage
and finding no support for an interpretation of the statute that resulted in a two-
tiered exchange approach.82 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Congress intended to
make subsidies available only in state-operated exchanges as an incentive to
states to opt into participation, while the Fourth Circuit found no support for the
suggestion that Congress intended a two-tiered system of exchanges.
Within a few months, the full D.C. Circuit Court vacated the panel's
decision and granted en banc review in the Halbig case.85 Meanwhile, another
federal district court in Oklahoma issued an opinion in Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v.
Burwell,8 6 following the D.C. Circuit's panel decision. A fourth case on the same
issue, Indiana v. Internal Revenue Service,87 was still pending. Meanwhile, the
challengers in the Fourth Circuit King case sought Supreme Court review.88
Perhaps emboldened by the November 2014 mid-term elections giving
Republicans control of both the House and the Senate,89 the Court granted
review 9 0 even though, on the present posture of the cases, there is no circuit split.
Whether the Court will now take the opportunity it passed up in NFIB v. Sebelius
to pull the rug out from under the ACA's private market reforms remains to be
seen.
78. See Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War, 38 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 225, 226 (2012); Huberfeld et al., supra note 62, at 36; Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,
Crafting a Narrative for the Red State Option, 102 KY. L.J. 381, 383 (2014).
79. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rehg en banc granted, vacated,
2014 WL 4627181 (2014).
80. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 376 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
81. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 394.
82. King, 759 F.3d at 376.
83. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 408.
84. King, 759 F.3d at 377.
85. Halbig v. Burwell, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181, at *I (D.C. Cir. 2014).
86. Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, No. CIV-1 1-30-RAW, 2014 WL 4854543 (E.D. Okla.).
87. Indiana v. IRS, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
88. See Brief for Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 2014 WL 7386999 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2014) (No.
14-114).
89. The Republicans Win the Senate, THE EcONOMIST (Nov. 5, 2014, 5:05 AM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/11/us-2014-mid-term-election-results; United
States House of Representatives Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/
UnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativeselections,_2014 (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
90. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475, 475 (2014).
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3. Potential King Fallout
If the Court reverses the Fourth Circuit decision, holding similarly to the
D.C. Circuit panel and Oklahoma District Court that federal premiums assistance
tax credits are not available in states with federally facilitated exchanges
("FFEs"), the results would be devastating. 91 Residents of more than half of the
states would be ineligible for federal assistance. Of the 12 million people
expected to apply for private insurance coverage through federally facilitated
exchanges, more than half, 7.3 million, were expected to qualify for federal
subsidies.92 The unavailability of federal subsidies would represent a loss of $36
billion in subsidies nationwide. 93
In addition to depriving so many individuals of federal subsidies, a
Supreme Court decision reversing King would have a cascade effect on multiple
other parts of the law. First, without federal financial assistance, private
insurance coverage would become unaffordable for many more people than
expected. That would mean more people would be exempt from the individual
mandate. As described previously, the more people who are not brought into the
risk pools created by the exchanges, the more vulnerable the private insurance
marketplace would be to the "death spiral" of adverse selection and resultant
premium rate inflation. 94
Second, combining the unavailability of premium assistance for middle-
income individuals and families with states' elections not to expand Medicaid for
low-income individuals and families, the gap in the ACA's near-universal
coverage strategy becomes even more gaping. There is strong alignment
between states that opted out of both Medicaid expansion and exchange
implementation. 95 Accordingly, in at least 22 states, individuals between 100%
and 400% of federal poverty level will be denied both government health
insurance through Medicaid as well as government assistance to purchase private
insurance through the exchanges.96 Another 12 states opted to expand Medicaid
91. See generally David Blumenthal & Sara R. Collins, The Supreme Court Decides to Hear
King v. Burwell: What Are the Implications?, COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2014/nov/the-supreme-court-decides-to-
hear-king; Adrianna McIntyre, King v. Burwell: The Supreme Court Case that Could Gut
Obamacare, Explained, Vox, http://www.vox.com/2014/11/7/7148215/obamacare-supreme-court-
subsidies-king (last updated June 12, 2015, 9:47 AM ET); Halbig, King Decisions Overturning
Subsidies May Hinder ACA Implementation, supra note 69.
92. LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URB. INST., HALBIG V. BURIWELL: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
ACA COVERAGE AND SUBSIDIES 1 (2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
413183-Halbig-v-Burwell-Potential-Implications-for-ACA-Coverage-and-Subsidies.pdf
93. Id.
94. See sources cited supra note 63 and accompanying text.
95. State Decisions on Health Insurance Marketplaces and the Medicaid Expansion, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-decisions-for-creating-
health-insurance-exchanges-and-expanding-medicaid/ (last updated July 20, 2015).
96. Current Status ofState Individual Marketplace and Medicaid Expansion Decisions, HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-health-insurance-
marketplace-and-medicaid-expansion-decisions/ (last updated July 20, 2015).
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but not to establish their own exchanges,97 meaning that the very poor would
have coverage but middle-income, often working poor, individuals and families
would not. One state, Idaho, made the opposite election-refusing to expand
Medicaid but establishing its own exchange, meaning the opposite-very low-
income adults would be denied public assistance through Medicaid but middle-
income individuals and families would receive federal subsidies to purchase
private insurance.98 A clear minority of states, 16 plus the District of Columbia,
have proceeded as Congress arguably intended, making both Medicaid expansion
and premium assistance tax subsidies available to their residents.99
Third, Supreme Court reversal in King could impact states' Medicaid
eligibility levels, whether they opted to expand or not. According to the D.C.
Circuit panel's reasoning in Halbig, states are required to maintain pre-ACA
eligibility levels until a "state exchange" is established.'00 The Halbig court
interpreted "state exchange" to refer only to exchanges in states that declined
FFE implementation. Accordingly, that reasoning would seem to require that
that states with FFEs would never be allowed to amend their Medicaid eligibility
because they would never establish a "state exchange."i 0
More precisely, the ACA contains a Medicaid "maintenance of effort"
("MOE") provision that was intended to prevent states from taking advantage of
the more generous federal match for the Medicaid expansion population by
dropping their current, optional coverage for some portion of the expansion
population.1 0 2  For example, pre-ACA, states may have opted not to cover
childless adults or to cover only those individuals with very low income levels.' 0 3
Under the Halbig panel decision, by definition, state-operated exchanges will not
be established in the 27 FFE states-at least for now. Therefore, those states will
not be released from the MOE and will be hamstrung to modify or alter their
current Medicaid programs in response to budgetary or other needs over time.
The D.C. Circuit panel accepted the plaintiffs' suggestion that such a result was
consistent with congressional design to protect impoverished individuals in states
where premium assistance subsidies would be unavailable.1 04  Given the
extraordinarily limited coverage in most states for those individuals, the
assurance of "protection" offers little comfort.
Fourth, Supreme Court reversal of the King decision would also impact the
ACA's strategy to shore up employer-based health insurance coverage because
the employer "free-rider" penalties are tied to availability of federal tax subsidies
on the exchanges. Accordingly, employers in FFE states will not be subject to
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
101. Id. at 406.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)(1) (2014).
103. See Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits for Adults as a Percent of the Federal Poverty
Level, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http:/Ikff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-income-
eligibility-limits-for-adults-at-application-2014/ (last updated Apr. 2015).
104. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 406.
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penalties for failing to offer affordable or adequate insurance. Under the ACA,
there are two ways that applicable large employers'05 may be penalized: the "pay-
or-play" penalty or the "free-rider" penalty.' 06 The "pay-or-play" penalty applies
to large employers that fail to offer minimum essential coverage to substantially
all of their employees by January 1, 2014.107 Even employers that meet the
requirement to offer coverage may be subject to "free-rider" penalties if the
coverage they offer is unaffordable (defined as costing more than 9.5% of
household income), or inadequate (defined as failing to provide at least 60%
actuarial value). 0 8  In either case, the employer penalty is triggered only if at
least one employee purchases coverage on the exchanges and qualifies for federal
subsidies.' 09 The notion is that employers, by failing to offer adequate or
affordable coverage, are imposing costs that otherwise will fall on the
government and taxpayers.
The first big, high-profile attempt to destabilize the ACA's individual and
small group market reforms was averted by a surprising Supreme Court decision
characterizing the individual mandate penalty as a tax, within Congress's
enumerated powers."1 0 Whether the highly technical statutory interpretation
challenge to the premium assistance tax subsidies will be successful remains to
be seen. If the challengers convince the Court that those subsidies should be
available only to residents of the minority of states that opted to establish their
own health insurance exchanges, the direct and spillover effects on the ACA's
universal coverage strategy will be dramatic.
105. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2014) (defining "applicable large employer" as "an employer
who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year").
106. Maureen Maly, Health Care Reform: Looking Ahead to 2014-Employer Mandate Part I
(Pay or Play and Free Rider Penalties), BEYOND HEALTH CARE REFORM (Mar. 2 2011),
http://beyondhealthcarereform.com/health-care-reform-looking-ahead-to-2014-employer-mandate-
part-i-pay-or-play-and-free-rider-penalties/.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2014). See also Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding
Health Care Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,8544(l)(A) (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts.
1, 54 and 301), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-02-12/pdf/2014-03082.pdf;
Fact Sheet: Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared Responsibility Under the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) for 2015, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Fact%20Sheet%20021014.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (delaying
implementation of penalty for mid-size employers (50-100 employees) for two years, providing
that large employers (100 or more employees) not required to cover any employees in 2014, and
defining "substantially all" as 70% of employees for 2015 and 95% (i.e., full implementation) in
2016).
108. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b)(2) (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i) & (ii) (2014). See also I.R.S.
Notice 2012-31, 2012-1 C.B. 906, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-12-31.pdf; I.R.S.
Notice 2011-73, 2011-2 C.B. 474, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n- 11-73.pdf.
109. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)(2) (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2014).
110. See supra Part IlI.B.l.
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C. Employer-sponsored Slice
As just described, the statutory construction challenge to the premium
assistance tax credit provisions of the ACA has a potentially serious impact on
employer-based health coverage. By removing the trigger for potential sanctions
on employers that provide affordable minimum essential coverage, employers
have little additional incentive to offer health insurance to their employees,
beyond pre-ACA tax and business incentives to do so. Accordingly, more
employers may cease offering coverage and fewer employers may begin offering
coverage than predicted."'
The employer-sponsored slice represents almost half of the universal
coverage pie. 2 Pre-ACA, close to half of all Americans obtained coverage,
either as employees or dependents of employees, from employer-sponsored
plans. Federal law has never required that employers offer health insurance to
their workers, and states are generally barred from imposing such a requirement
as a matter of ERISA preemption.11 3 Historically, employers provide employee
health coverage because any amount spent on employee benefits is excluded
from taxable income."1 4  Moreover, it is generally in employers' interests to
maintain a healthy workforce and prevent lost productivity due to illness." 5
Although the United States is relatively unique among developed countries in
relying so heavily on employer-based insurance, it has become as matter of
custom and expectation for many industries and professions."16
The ACA still does not require employers to offer health insurance to their
employees, but the law does apply additional nudges. First, the law offers federal
tax credits to certain small employers, in a manner similar to the approach toward
individuals of making the purchase of commercial insurance through the
exchanges more affordable. Employers with fewer than 25 full-time equivalent
employees and average wages under $50,000 annually qualify for the subsidies
as long as they pay 50% of the cost of employees' plans purchased through the
small business health options program ("SHOP")." The credit is available for
the first two consecutive years during which the small business offers its
111. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
112. See Garfield et al., supra note 5.
113. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (2014); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). See also Retail
Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fiedler, 475 F.3d 180, 180 (4th Cir. 2007) (striking down Maryland's "Fair
Share Health Care Fund Act," which had the effect of requiring very large employers to offer
health plans to their employees); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 761 (9th Cir.
1980) (striking down Hawaii's employer mandate).
114. See Leonard, supra note 6, at 760-61.
115. Id.at761.
116. Id.
117. 26 U.S.C. § 45R(d) (2014). See also Small Business Health Care Tax Credit and the
SHOP Marketplace, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Employers/Small-
Business-Health-Care-Tax-Credit-and-the-SHOP-Marketplace (last updated Aug. 13, 2015).
SHOP is a different type of private-market health insurance exchange that states may establish
under the ACA. Id. The availability of small business tax subsidies in states with FFEs has not
been questioned in King, Halbig, or related cases.
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employees coverage through the SHOP. 18 There are other incentives for larger
employers, discussed next.
1. Employer Penalties
In addition to carrots, in the form of tax subsidies to assist certain small
employers to purchase health plans for their employees, the ACA also includes
sticks, in the form of sanctions on certain large employers for failing to offer
coverage that meets certain requirements. The employer responsibility
provisions are fairly narrowly circumscribed. First, only a very small percentage
of employers are subject to the requirements. Second, the penalties are triggered
only under particular circumstances.120 Specifically, only employers with 50 or
more full-time equivalent employees face the sanctions, which means that 96%
of employers in United States are exempt even from the potential for sanctions
on that basis alone. 12 1 Of the remaining 4% of employers, half (2%) already offer
employee health plans that meet the ACA requirements and, thus, would not be
sanctioned. Accordingly, a mere 2% of U.S. employers risk the potential
sanctions for failing to offer ACA-compliant coverage to their employees.
Second, the employer penalties do not operate as an across-the-board
mandate but arise only under precise scenarios. As described above, the ACA
includes a pay-or-play penalty, applicable to any large employer that fails to offer
health insurance to "substantially all" of its employees, and a "free-rider" penalty
applicable to employers who fail to offer coverage meeting the ACA's standards
for affordability and minimum essential coverage. The "free-rider" penalty
attaches only if a full-time employee then purchases private insurance on the
exchanges and is of low enough income to qualify for federal premium assistance
tax subsidies. Moreover, if the Supreme Court in King decides that those
subsidies are available only in states with state-operated exchanges, the employer
penalty would never be triggered in FFE states, leaving employers of all sizes
exempt from any added pressure to extend employee health coverage.
Even aside from King, a Republican proposal that recently passed the
federal House of Representatives would redefine "full-time employee" from 30
hours per week, as the ACA presently provides, to 40 hours per week.122 That
amendment would have the effect of exempting even more employers from the
118. 26 U.S.C. § 45R(e)(2) (2014).
119. Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the
Affordable Care Act, IRS.Gov (updated May 20, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-
Act/Employers/Questions-and-Answers-on-Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions-Under-
the-Affordable-Care-Act.
120. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
121. Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared Responsibility
Under the Affordable Care Act for 2015, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j 12290.aspx.
122. See Save American Workers Act of 2014, H.R. 2757, 113th Cong. (2013-14),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 13th-congress/house-bill/2575.
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penalties and leave even more employees without coverage.1 23 The upshot is that
the vast majority of employers do not have to do anything different under the
ACA than they were doing previously, and for the very few employers that are
implicated, the pressure that the ACA applies may be fairly diffuse.
Nevertheless, employers expressed concern about meeting the January 2014
deadline for compliance with the new ACA requirements. Through
administrative rulemaking, the effective date for these employer responsibility
provisions has twice been delayed. 124 Under IRS regulations, no employer will
face sanctions for 2014, despite the statute's clear reference to that date.
Employers with 50-99 full-time equivalent employees are not subject to any
sanctions for two years, until 2016. The regulations also effectively stagger
implementation of potential "pay-or-play" sanctions for employers with 100 or
more employees by defining "substantially all" as 70% of employees for 2015,
and 95% of employees for 2016 and thereafter. Also, for 2015, the first 80
employees, rather than first 30, are excluded from the $2,000 per employee per
month penalty.125 Those adjustments to ACA implementation will further dilute
the impact of the employer coverage incentives.
At this point, the reader should not be surprised to learn that the IRS
rulemaking has also become the subject of legal challenge.1 26 John Boehner, the
Republican Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, on November 21,
2014, filed a lawsuit on behalf of Republican members of the House, against the
secretaries of the IRS and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") for abuse of executive power in delaying implementation of the
employer requirements, contrary to clear statutory language.' 27 The case asserts
that federal dollars were not properly appropriated to offer premium assistance
tax subsidies in any states, including the 14 states with state-operated
exchanges.128 House v. Burwell is pending in the D.C. Circuit Court, the same
123. Rob Garver, How the GOP's 40-Hour Workweek Bill Could Backfire, FISCAL TIMES (Jan.
7, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/01/07/How-GOP-s-40-Hour-Workweek-Bill-Could-
Backfire.
124. Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the
Affordable Care Act, IRS.GOv, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-
Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions-Under-the-Affordable-Care-Act#Transition (last
updated May 20, 2015); Fact Sheet: Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared
Responsibility Under the Affordable Care Act (A CA) for 2015, supra note 107.
125. Ilyse W. Schuman, United States: IRS Final Rule Partially Delays ACA Employer Shared
Responsibility Requirement, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/295406/employee+
rights+labour+relations/IRS+Final+Rule+Partially+Delays+ACA+Employer+Shared+Responsibilit
y+Requirement (last updated Feb. 26, 2014).
126. Jessica L. Roberts, Executive Power and the Employer Mandate, HEALTHLAWPROF BLOG
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof-blog/2014/1 1/guest-blogger-
assistant-professor-jessica-l-roberts-executive-power-and-the-employer-mandate-roberts.html.
127. Complaint at 14-17, United States House of Representatives v. Burwell et al., No. 14-CV-
01967 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2014), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/boehnerburwell_
20141121.pdf.
128. Michael F. Cannon, What the House ObamaCare Lawsuit and 'King v. Burwell' Have in
Common, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcannon/2014/
11/21/what-the-house-obamacare-lawsuit-and-king-v-burwell-have-in-common/.
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court, a panel of which initially accepted Halbig's strict statutory interpretation
against availability of premium assistance tax subsidies FFE states.1 2 9
Considerable questions remain about the procedural and substantive viability of
House, but the litigation seems clearly calculated to undermine the overall
effectiveness of the ACA's near-universal coverage strategy.1 30 Combined with
the already limited reach of the ACA's employer responsibility provisions, the
case further undermines the statutory scheme.
2. Preventive Services Coverage Mandate
Another seemingly narrower attack on the employer responsibility
provisions of the ACA focused on the mandate to cover preventive services. But,
like the challenges discussed above, that attack has the potential to unravel the
fragile web of coverage that the ACA attempted to construct. Under the ACA's
preventive services mandate, all private plans, including individual, small group,
large group, and self-insured employer plans, must provide "first dollar"
coverage for preventive services, meaning without charging deductibles,
copayments, or coinsurance.' 31 Acting under authority delegated by the ACA,
through administrative guidelines, HHS defined preventive services to include
well-woman visits, contraception, and domestic violence screening and
counseling.1 3 2 The list of covered contraception included at least four types that
certain religious organizations consider abortion because they have the effect of
preventing an already fertilized egg from attaching to the uterus and
developing.' 33  For that reason, a number of employers challenged the
contraceptive coverage mandate on religious liberties grounds.
By statute, regulation, and judicial order, application of the ACA's
preventive services mandate to employer-based coverage has been gradually
eroded. As a starting point, under the ACA, employers with 50 or fewer
employees are not required to cover any preventive care services, including the
129. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 392, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
130. See Roberts, supra note 126.
131. Grandfathered plans in existence as of March 23, 2010 are exempt from the preventive
services coverage mandate. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PREVENTIVE SERVICES COVERED BY
PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2014), available at
http://files.kff.org/attachment/preventive-services-covered-by-private-health-plans-under-the-
affordable-care-act-fact-sheet.
132. Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2011/08/
womensprevention0801201 Ia.html (updated June 28, 2013); PREVENTIVE SERVICES COVERED BY
PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 131, at 3.
133. Jaime Fuller, Here's What You Need to Know About the Hobby Lobby Case, WASH. POST
(Mar. 24, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/03/24/heres-what-you-need-to-
know-about-the-hobby-lobby-case/; Lindsey Surratt, Four Things Employers Need to Know About
the Hobby Lobby Decision (July 7, 2014), www.healthcarereformdigest.com/four-things-
employers-need-to-know-about-the-hobby-lobby-decision.
578 [Vol. 46
Spring 2015] FRAGILITY OF UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 579
four objectionable forms of contraception.' 34  Also, grandfathered plans in
existence as of March 23, 2010 that have not significantly changed and thus lost
grandfathered status135 are exempt from the mandate. For the remaining
employers subject to the requirement, the mandate took effect January 1, 2012.
But the religious objection brought about exemption of a number of
additional employers. By regulations issued in July 2013, religious employers
(nonprofit corporations including churches, houses of worship, church
auxiliaries, conventions, and religious orders) are exempt from the contraceptive
coverage mandate.' 36 The same set of rules provided an accommodation for
certain non-profit religious organizations (as well as nonprofits that hold
themselves out as religious organizations and object on the basis of religion to
coverage for some or all of the forms of contraception, e.g., Notre Dame
University and Wheaton College). 37 Non-profit religious organizations that self-
certify their objection to HHS are still required to provide access to the
contraception but do not have to pay any portion of the premiums for that
particular benefit.' 38  Effectively, insurance companies selling group plans to
self-certifying non-profit religious organizations must provide a separate plan to
cover that benefit, and none of the benefit may be paid for by the objecting
employer.
Despite the above administrative exemption and accommodation, other
religious employers continued to object to the contraceptive coverage mandate.
In particular, certain for-profit employers challenged the rule as violating the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") by requiring them to
provide their employees with free access to the forms of contraception that
violate their sincere religious beliefs that life begins at conception.' 39 Essentially,
these employers sought accommodations similar to those already granted to non-
profit religious organizations. In a highly anticipated opinion, the Supreme
Court, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., held that the contraceptive
coverage mandate substantially burdens the plaintiff for-profit corporations'
exercise of religion. 40 Noting the Administration's regulatory accommodation
for non-profit religious employers, the Court concluded that the RFRA's "least
134. See Alan E. Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance,
114 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 1, 5 (Jan. 2014), http://columbialawreview.org/contraception-
mandate-garfield/.
135. See id. See also Leonard, supra note 6, at 765-69 (discussing difficulty of maintaining
grandfathered status).
136. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (Westlaw current through Mar. 26, 2015).
137. Id. § 147.131(b) (Westlaw current through Mar. 26, 2015).
138. Under a typical employer health plan, the employer pays a substantial share of each
employee's individual or family health insurance plan, and the employee pays the remainder.
Under this accommodation, the insurer would only be able to collect the employees' share of the
premiums and would have to arrange coverage for eligible employees, at no cost to the employee or
employer. Women's Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations,
CMS.GOv, www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/womens-preven-02012013.
html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
139. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764-67 (2014).
140. Id. at 2775.
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restrictive means" test was not met because a similar accommodation easily
could be extended to the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs.1 4 1
But within a week of the Court holding in Hobby Lobby that the regulatory
accommodation already adopted for non-profit religious organizations would
satisfy RFRA with respect to for-profit religious organizations, the Court
enjoined that very regulatory accommodation. Specifically, the Court granted an
injunction to Wheaton College, a non-profit religious organization, against
enforcement of the self-certification option.1 4 2 The highly unusual, unsigned
emergency injunction provided that instead of notifying its own third-party
insurer under the self-certification method described above, Wheaton College
could instead notify the government directly, which would then notify the
insurer, of the employer's objection. 43 Employees would still be guaranteed
first-dollar contraceptive coverage, but the employer's involvement in providing
the coverage would be further attenuated.1 4 4 Adding one additional step in the
process, thereby further distancing the religious organization from facilitating
what it considers abortion, seemed to satisfy the employer's religious objections.
The effect of the Court's injunction, however, is to open to question the
legitimacy of the very accommodation on which the Hobby Lobby decision for
for-profit religious organizations was based.
In the greater scheme of the law, the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby
Lobby is more significant for defining the scope of religious freedom recognized
under RFRA (as distinguished from the First Amendment) and extension of
individual liberties to corporate entities. But the decision, and related decisions
and administrative actions that followed, have implications for the ACA's
universal coverage strategy as well. Adding to the existing statutory exemption
for small employers, regulatory exemption for religious employers, and
regulatory accommodation for nonprofit religious organizations, the
Administration responded to the Court's decision by extending the regulatory
accommodation to closely held for-profit religious organizations.
Meanwhile, Wheaton College and other nonprofit religious employers
challenged that very accommodation as burdening their religious beliefs. The
Administration accordingly revised that accommodation, allowing employers to
place themselves at one additional step removed from the provision of
contraception. Regulatory rulemaking is still working out the definition of
organizations to which the accommodation would extend. The particulars aside,
approximately 90% of all businesses in the United States would fall into the
141. Id. at 2782.
142. Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2806 (2014).
143. Id. at 2807.
144. Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: New Accommodations for Employers on
Contraceptive Coverage, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 22, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2014/08/22/implementing-health-reform-new-accommodations-for-employers-on-contraceptiv
e-coverage/; Women's Preventive Services Coverage and Non-Profit Religious Organizations,
supra note 138.
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category of closely held corporation.1 4 5 Questions remain whether other closely
held (or, for that matter, publicly traded or other types of employers) could
successful challenge other coverage mandates or other ACA requirements on
corporate individual liberty grounds. Those challenges would further erode the
ACA's strategy of extending employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion aims to highlight the intricacy as well as the
fragility of the ACA's goal of achieving near-universal health insurance coverage
by combining expansion of government health-care programs, reforming the
private health insurance market, and adjusting the incentives for employer-
sponsored health insurance. That patchwork strategy had significant advantages
politically, in terms of getting the massive legislation passed, but also has
significant drawbacks in terms of achieving the law's goals. Each component of
the strategy-government, private market, and employer-based insurance-has
sustained repeated blows and resulting erosion. As a result, fewer uninsured
Americans may stand to benefit from the law than predicted. It is beyond the
scope of this brief Article to offer a sweeping, alternative model for coverage
expansion. By revealing the drawbacks of the patchwork approach, however, it
may embolden lawmakers to embrace a more radical, truly systemic, fix the next
time the opportunity arises.
145. Brett LoGiurato, More than 90% of Corporations in the US Are Just Like the One at the
Center of Today's Obamacare Decision, Bus. INSIDER (June 30, 2014, 1:11 PM),
www.businessinsider.com/closely-held-companies-hobby-lobby-decision-obamacare-2014-6.
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